Course XXXIII - Teaching 1: Eloquence and Oratory

“Eloquence (oratory)”, Kant says, “is the art of giving to a serious exercise of the understanding the character of a free imagination game; poetry is the art of giving to a free imagination game the character of a serious exercise of the understanding.”
Quintilian says “eloquentia est ars dicendi accomodata ad persuadendum quod honestum sit, quod oporteat”¸ so he delimits through the last words that which Cicero had said: “Officium oratoriae facultatis videtur esse: dicere apposite ad persuasionem; fluida perduadere dictione”. Even so, Quintilian’s words are rather of oratory, according to many authors in matter, who reduce the name of eloquence to a natural faculty tending to move the spirits through the word.
If to this natural inclination you add the art that cultivates and makes it fit to every use of the word, then as a result of it, this is oratory.
In spite of its natural source and response to spontaneous motives, one must appeal to art resources, since we cannot achieve the explicit purpose of oratory if we do not have them.
Although wild rude men, wild peoples and even primitive human expressions no doubt offer patterns of natural eloquence or rather eloquent expressions. But neither Demosthenes, nor Cicero, nor Bossuet have been able to write down their more poor speech without constancy, love for study and art, which never are deserted. Amid furious fights, popular riots, turbulent assemblies, wherever passions grow and are out of control, quite eloquent features deserving to be conveyed to posterity emerge. But to fight face to face deep-rooted worries, to overcome the inconstancy of the Athenians and Philip’s gold, to crash Catilin’s boldness, to save a nation from its imminent bankruptcy, to sustain the cause of the helpless Ireland, to make resound the voice of religion in chests infected by vices, frivolity and skepticism, an iron will-to-work is indispensable, and inborn privileged gifts are not enough, because only on the dint of fight and suffering one can acquire science, knowledge of man, and free command (use) of imagination, passions and word.
So, this art of the speech, in order to achieve the purpose of our words, needs substantial arguments, clear method and probity, along with gracious style and expression, but the good sense remains the foundation of any speech.
This “art of persuasion” has multiple facets. But we must clearly show the difference between “convincing” and “persuading”. Conviction refers only to the understanding, and persuasion to the will and practice. The task of the philosopher will consist in convincing, but the task of an orator will consist in persuading people to act in accordance with the conviction of the truth. Not always conviction is side by side with persuasion. Certainly the two must go together: and this must be so if the inclination continuously follows the opinion of one’s innermost being. You may be convinced of virtue and justice as laudable values and at the same time perhaps you are not persuaded so as to act in accordance with virtue and justice. One’s inclination may be against, even though our reason feels satisfied, and perhaps passions prevail against our understanding.
So the task of an orator must be to act in accordance with his own conviction.
Three grades of oratorical eloquence will be set up: First and lowest grade, only aiming at and pleasing the audience; in general, eloquence in panegyrics, inaugural speech, and so on. It is of ornamental kind. Second grade: it is higher, and the orator aims not only at pleasing, but also at informing, instructing and persuading. And the third grade: greatly influencing the soul, convincing it and arousing the interest, so the orator moves and attracts the soul, and finally leads the audience to decide and act in accordance with the expressed cause. Generally this type of eloquence comes along with certain lofty passion that arouses fervor in the heart of the orator and conveys a sort of vocational fire to the audience.
The ancients divided the public locution into three kinds: demonstrative, deliberative and judicial. The first was of praise or vituperation; the second, of persuasion and dissuasion; and the third, of accusation or defense. The three may be respectively related to popular meetings, pulpit and forum. In regard to Quintilian’s words (“The main thing in art is to preserve decorum”) we should add the advice of Cicero to orators in his “Orator, to Brutus”: “The good sense is the foundation of eloquence, like of all the rest. Its most difficult aspect, as in life, is to see that which decency calls forth, and one makes mistakes many times by ignoring this. So one must not speak with the same style and the same thoughts to men of different classes, age and wealth, and on different times, places and audiences. In every part of the speech, as in one’s behavior, we must attend to what is decent, and see what is the matter, which persons are speaking, and whom the speech is aiming at”.
Of course, the bad reputation of an orator particularly spoils the effects of eloquence, even though this eloquence is truly fiery and spontaneous. Ethics cannot be apart from aesthetics. So, professional probity of a judicial orator, exemplary virtues and piety of a sacred orator, scientific renown of a lecturer about doctrines in academies, classes and congresses, contribute to oratory, like prisms in a diaphanous crystal, which increase enormously the power of light.
Also he needs complete serenity, balanced and wise courage and self-control in order to preserve, even at his most enthusiastic moments, a full control of his own will.
His sensibility will be virile and profound, not soft and languid, and seek freely the vehemence, if necessary. And from his self-knowledge, the knowledge must emerge of both human misery and greatness that, through virtuous reputation, conviction, courage, boldness, fearlessness, sensibility, ductility, memory, and usual solitary reflection convey his inner speech through an outer speech.
He must add to these qualities intellectual qualities –substantial reason, and general, analytic and methodic spirit; rapid and steady judgment; inventiveness and cautiousness of a dialectician, but not misusing an extreme subtlety so that he becomes a sophist.
He must know the eloquence of silence, if necessary the eloquence of action, regardless the word and, above all, the highest eloquence of love for the cause that he is defending, being capable of dying in the line of his own ideal. Authority arisen from fidelity never will be excelled by oratory rules or precepts. And he must know this since the beginning.